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JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (i) (1996).

ISSUES PRESENTED

Was a "commercial lease" unenforceable for lack of mutual
assent as to the nature, extent, and boundary of the property to
be leased, and the failure of the lease to assign the duty to pay
for interior improvements ($168,000.00) to either party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of
a contract is "correctness" or "correction of error".

Seashores,

Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
If the contract is ambiguous and the trial court received
extrinsic evidence, the standard of review would be the more
deferential ''clearly-erroneous" standard.

(Barnes v. Woodf 750

P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah App. 1988).
Finally, if a party challenges the trial court's
interpretation of an ambiguous contract, that party must marshal
all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support
the findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly
erroneous.

(Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547, (Utah App. 1989) .

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Appellee knows of no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, or regulations which are determinative of this
appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

In this case, the trial court found that
Plaintiff/Appellant, hereinafter referred to as "Nielsen" failed
to sustain his burden of proof that there was a "meeting of the
minds" as to essential, material terms of a lease agreement,
namely what was the nature, extent, and boundary of the property
to be leased, and which party was to pay for improvements to the
subject property.
The trial court found the lease agreement unenforceable for
lack of mutual assent and Nielsen filed this appeal.

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Nielsen filed a Verified Complaint on August 25, 1998, in
Utah County, State of Utah. [R. 8 ] .
Defendant/Appellee, hereinafter referred to as "Peterson",
filed his Answer on September 14, 1998.

[R. 15] .

Trial was held on December 12, 2000, and a Ruling was issued
on January 24, 2001.

[R. 120].

Nielsen filed his Objection to the proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Dismissal.

[R. 128],

The trial court considered the objections of Nielsen, denied
3

the same, and executed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment of Dismissal. [R. 142].
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of
Dismissal were entered on May 11, 2001. [R. 148, 151] .
Nielsen appealed the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal on
June 11, 2001. [R. 156].

C.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT

The trial court considered the evidence presented by the
parties, considered the argument of counsel and applicable cases,
and issued its final ruling that Nielsen did not sustain his
burden of proof and that his Complaint should be dismissed.

D.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On August 18, 1997, Nielsen and Peterson signed a

"commercial lease" which referred to "premises" described as a
strip mall at 1341 E. Center, Spanish Fork, Utah, 84660.
2.

The lease was prepared by Nielsen.

[R. 3 ] .

[R. 161, H 33,

L.

12-13; P. 35, L. 20].
3.

At the time of the signing, the mall was under

construction.
4.

[R. 119, K 2 ] .

At the time of the signing, the property was not zoned

for the operation of a health club.
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[R. 119].

5.

The lease was presented to Spanish Fork City's zoning

commission which granted a zoning change to accommodate the
operation of a health club.
6.

[R. 119, % 4] .

The "premises" were not ready for occupancy on August

18, 1997, nor on November 1, 1997.

[R. 161, P. 37, L. 2-6;

L.

17-21].
7.

The responsibility for paying the cost of improvements

was not addressed in the lease. [R. 161, P. 37-38, L. 3] .
8.

The utilities were always in the name of Nielsen.

[R.

161, P. 38, L. 4-11].
9.

Nielsen never gave Peterson written notice that he

could take possession of the "premises".

[R. 161, P. 39, L. 6-

10] .
10.

Nielsen failed to fill in the blanks on paragraph

number nine (9) which allowed the tenant to terminate the lease
if possession of the "premises" were not delivered [R. 3, % Subparagraph number fourteen (14) regarding notice, [R. 3, ^ 14];
paragraph number twenty-two (22) regarding the rental amount upon
exercise of an option to renew [R. 3, % 22]; and paragraph number
twenty-four (24) regarding radon gas in the buildings [R. 3, %
24] .
11.
party.

The addendum to the lease was not signed by either
[R. 1] .
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12.

Peterson obtained architectural plans and an estimate

for improvements.
13.

[R. 119, P. 6-7].

Nielsen and Peterson disagreed as to who would pay the

cost of improvements ($168,000.00).

[R. 119, 118, % 8 ] .

14.

Gold's Gym never moved into the premises.

[R. 118, <f

15.

On February 3, 1998, Nielsen gave Peterson written

9] .

notice terminating the lease.
16.

[Exhibit 5 ] .

One day later, on February 4, 1998, Nielsen entered

into a lease agreement with World's Gym (Jimmy Zufelt) for the
premises.
17.

[Exhibit 17].
The trial court found that mutual assent regarding

price, duration, and the extent and boundary of the property was
required [R. 117, 145], that the lease was "utterly silent" on
who was to pay for improvements ($168,000.00) [R. 116], and that
Nielsen had failed to show a meeting of the minds on each
material term.
18.

[R. 116, 115, 114].

In addition, the trial court found that improvements

were not even discussed until weeks after the lease was signed
[R. 115], and that while Nielsen argued "industry standard", no
evidence was presented whatsoever to support his contention [R.
115] .
19.

Finally, the trial court found that Nielsen himself
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told KBR Construction (Buck Robinson) that no agreement had yet
been reached with respect to interior improvements.

[R. 114] .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The commercial lease was ambiguous and incomplete on its
face by failing to define the nature, extent, and boundary of the
lease property and by failing to assign the duty to pay for
interior improvements ($168,000.00) to either party.
There was no mutual assent or meeting of the minds as to
essential, material terms of the agreement and therefore the
lease was unenforceable.

ARGUMENT

I.

The "commercial lease" was ambiguous and

incomplete on its face by failing to define the nature, extent,
and boundary of the lease property, and by failing to assign the
duty to pay for interior improvements ($168,000.00) to either
party.

In finding the lease in the instant case unenforceable, the
trial court carefully considered conditions precedent to the

7

enforcement of a contract and the requirement of mutual assent to
all material terms.
In the case of Candland v. Oldrovd 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah
1926), the court stated in part, as follows:
Mutual assent is fundamental to every
enforceable contract. It means that each
party has "a definite, understandable, and
unequivocal meeting of the minds upon the
terms of the contract"; that is to say, each
party must agree without reservation to what
he is required to do and to what the other
party is required and expected to do.
In the instant case, neither party understood who was to pay
for interior improvements and in fact had not discussed the
matter prior to execution of the lease. [R. 161, P. 37-38, L.3].
The cost of the interior improvements was $168,000.00. [R. 119,
P. 6-7].

Nielsen and Peterson disagreed as to who was

responsible to pay these costs and the lease was silent on the
matter. [R. 119, 118, P. 8 ] .
In the case of Commercial Union Associates, 863 P.2d 29, 3637 (Utah App. 1993), the court stated in part, as follows:
A condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there be a meeting of
the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or implicitly,
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.

In the instant case, the lease was completely silent
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regarding the duty to install and pay for interior improvements
and accordingly, no duty could be assigned or enforcement
obtained regarding this material term.
Nielsen had the burden of proof to show "the parties' mutual
assent as to all material terms and conditions."

Cal Wadsworth

Construction v. City of St. George 898 P.2d 1372. 1376 (Utah
1995).
In the instant case, Nielsen conceded that the duty to pay
for improvements was not discussed prior to execution of the
lease, but went on to argue that "industry custom" could
establish the missing term.

However, Nielsen failed to present

any evidence that such an industry custom existed.
It is noteworthy that Nielsen argued that the lease was
fully integrated and that no extrinsic evidence should be
considered. [R. 115, Note 7 ] , The trial court observed that
Nielsen urged consideration of trade usage or custom to fill in
the missing term.

Such trade usage or custom would be "wholly

dependent on extrinsic evidence". [R. 115, Note 8 ] .
The trial court cited the case of Birdzell v. Utah Oil
Refining Company. 242 P.2d 578. 580 (Utah 1952) for the following
proposition:
. . . it may be stated as settled law that a
memorandum of agreement for a lease which is
required to be in writing, in order to
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satisfy the statute of frauds, must contain
all the essential and material parts of the
lease which is to be executed thereafter
according to its terms, and particularly must
contain three (3) essentials in order to
(sic) its validity under that statute of
frauds. These are: First, a definite
agreement as to the extent and boundary of
the property to be leased; Second, a definite
and agreed term; and Third, a definite and
agreed rental and the time and manner of its
payment.
In the instant case, the lease referred to "the premises" as
"a strip mall at 1341 E. Center, Spanish Fork, Utah, 84660". [R.
3] .
Exhibit 2, Attachment A, submitted at trial by Nielsen,
refers to the premises containing 18,315 square feet [Exhibit 2 ] .
The bid for interior improvements of $168,000.00 refers to 11,032
square feet [Exhibit 14].
The lease fails to specify the square footage at all, and an
addendum to the lease, not executed by either party, refers to
"over 10,000 square feet" or "otherwise". [R. 3 and R. 1 ] .
Finally, paragraph number three (3) of the lease imposes a
duty on the lessee to maintain the premises "in as good condition
as received". [R. 3 ] . The trial court noted that this provision
appeared to impose the duty to complete the interior improvements
on Nielsen. [R. 116, Note 5 ] .
Nielsen argues that the lease was not ambiguous as to a
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description of the "premises".

The record however, reveals that

the "premises" could be:
1.

An entire strip mall; [R. 3]

2.

18,315 square feet; [Exhibit 2, Attachment A]

3.

11,032 square feet; [Exhibit 14]

4.

Over 10,000 square feet; [R. 3 and R. 1]

5.

Other than 10,00 0 square feet; [R.3 and R. 1]

6.

A shell; [R. 116, Note 6]

7.

A finished building. [R. 116, Note 6 ] .

In the case of Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57,60
(Utah

APTD.

1990) the court stated, in part, as follows:
Language in a written document is ambiguous
if the words used may be understood to
support two or more plausible meanings.

In the instant case, the "premises" could be understood to
support up to seven (7) plausible meanings.

The lease is

therefore ambiguous and incomplete and therefore unenforceable.

II.

There was no mutual assent as to essential, material

terms and therefore the lease is unenforceable.

The trial court found the lease deficient and incomplete
because it did not assign which party was to pay for the interior
improvements.

Having found the lease to be insufficient, the
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trial court looked to extrinsic evidence for clarification.
However, the trial court stated:
Nor does the extrinsic evidence establish the
necessary assent. In this case each party
conceded that improvements were not even
discussed until well after the contract had
been signed. This fact precludes the
possibility that some oral understanding was
reached at the time of contract execution as
to payment for the improvements. [R. 115, P.
13 .

Both parties conceded that the subject was not discussed
until "well after" the lease was signed.

Nielsen argued

"industry custom" but provided no evidence of the same. [R. 115,
P. 1] .
In the case of West Valley City v. Majestic Ink Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) the court stated in part as
follows:
We review the trial court's construction
based on extrinsic evidence under the more
deferential clearly-erroneous standard. A
party challenging the court's interpretation
of ambiguous terms of a contract faces a
substantial appellant burden. We affirm the
trial court's findings if they are based on
sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court's
construction.
In the instant case, Nielsen did not challenge the findings
of the trial court, did not marshal all relevant evidence to
support the findings, and then demonstrate why the findings are
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clearly erroneous, and therefore the trial court's finding that
there was no meeting of the minds regarding an essential material
term is unrebutted.
In the absence of mutual assent as to essential, material
terms, the lease is unenforceable.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully urged that the trial court's conclusion
that the lease is unenforceable for lack of mutual assent should
be affirmed.
DATED this _3

day of

ft

<j

, 2002.

C.
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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